Diplomats recently met several extremism watchers and discussed various scenario caused by internal conditions in the post-election world. Experts differed in their analysis, but agreed that given the highly successful containment of jangis in Bangladesh, their rise linked to the election results appeared unlikely. Jangis operate around socio-economic issues, not electoral ones.
Meanwhile, a section in India is anxious that China will continue to march in in what was traditionally its political backyard of sorts as a result of the elections. To them, China also means ISI — read Pakistan — and Islamists; so, it is worried if the electoral victory serves India or China more.

Bharat Bhushan of Asian Age, an influential columnist who is also a Sino-Bangladesh relations watcher, says: ‘Although China and India both welcomed the political continuity in Bangladesh, their stakes are very different. China wants a strategic foothold in Bangladesh to counter the United States and, secondarily, India. Its inroads into the domestic politics of the country through business relations with prominent families of the ruling party can help it advance its strategic goals. The Awami League government has given several entry points to China. Bangladesh is an integral part of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)….’
Bharat speculates that China wants some kind of ‘guarantee’ from Dhaka to protect its interests and investments, including the mega projects. The bulk of the BRI funds — 40 billion dollars — are expected to flow into Bangladesh after the recently-concluded elections: ‘China had an interest in political continuity.’
China also sees Bangladesh as a destination of its sunset industries and it could become the preferential entry point for ‘Chinese’ goods from least developed countries to the western markets, the writer says.

Indian ask is not big?
THE columnist says, compared with China, India wants very few things: (a) denial of shelter to the north-eastern insurgents in Bangladesh, (b) prevention of jongis and illegal immigrants from crossing to India and (c) containment of Pakistan ISI’s ‘mischief’, including pushing fake currency across the border.
He claims that Sheikh Hasina’s government has complied on all these issues, which is why India is supporting the Awami League. But Bharat’s anxiety does not end. ‘Entry of China in Bangladesh had an Indian nod. The Chinese footprint is set to expand over time. The Chinese expansion will marginalise the role of both India and the United States. As this great game unfolds, it remains to be seen whether or not Indian interests will get squeezed out of Bangladesh.’
If he seems more anxious than usual, even forgetting India’s enormous economic presence at almost every level in Bangladesh, that is because it reflects the rising Indo-China ties, in general, which, however, China dominates.

Good elections and South Asian stability
MIHIR Sharma writing in the Economic Times praised Bangladesh and Sheikh Hasina’s government’s performance, but said that the elections could be more transparent.
He thinks that Sheikh Hasina, like all mortals, will not last forever and unless ‘democratic institutions that have been damaged are restored, Bangladesh could cause regional problems.’ And crisis will cause serious problems for the stability of South and Southeast Asia.
These expressions also show that the simpler, unipolar South Asia with India dominating is over and India’s own anxiety could influence events elsewhere. With India and China competing robustly, they are anxious if Sino-Indian interests will be affected or not by Bangladesh elections.

The BRI factor
THE BRI initiative continues to generate anxiety in India and China is being seen as a major threat to regional stability. Dr Brahma Chellaney, writing in the Hindustan Times on January 8, says: ‘India is inadvertently lending a helping hand to Beijing’s strategy of engagement as a facade for containment. India has done little more than implore China to rein in its spiralling trade surplus. The lopsided trade relationship makes India essentially a colonial-style raw-material appendage of the state-led Chinese economy, which increasingly dumps manufactured goods there.’
Such harshness can only be caused by real fear. For its side, China’s position on BRI is stated as: ‘When BRI was just starting, a few countries were sceptical of its intention, and believed the concept was the latest in “geopolitical strategy” or “neo-colonialism”. The accomplishments since then have shown the world otherwise and silenced sceptics. Today, only a few countries remain biased. By deepening an understanding of BRI principles, other countries have discovered it is a path that enhances strategic mutual trust with China.’ (Global Times, China)
In other words, China is still very official and very non-negotiable. BRI goes on and its not engaging on the issue as some countries, particularly India, would like to.
With regional development come rivalries, progress, and anxieties. Bangladesh elections are no longer just an internal matter and may become even less so in the future. And the Indo-Chinese rivalry will become a very big part of that. Future rulers may have to consider issues far beyond their local constituency management.

Afsan Chowdhury is a journalist and researcher.